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The Impact of the National Minimum Wage  





The National Minimum Wage (NMW) came into force in April 1999 at an initial rate 
of £3.60 per hour for adults and £3.00 for those under 21 and for new employees in 
receipt of accredited training. 1 Its introduction dramatically reduced the prevalence of 
low pay in the UK. In April 1998, some 1.4 million jobs were estimated to provide 
gross hourly earnings below NMW rates. This figure had fallen to around 0.5 million 
by April 1999 and just 0.25 million by April 2000 (Table 1).  
 
* Table 1 Number of jobs paid below National Minimum Wage rates*  
 
Those workers earning less than the NMW prior to its introduction were entitled to a 
pay rise that averaged around 20 per cent of gross hourly earnings.2 The cumulative 
result was to increase the national wage bill by an estimated 0.25-0.35 per cent over 
the period April 1998 to April 1999 (Low Pay Commission, 2001a: 52). The various 
upratings of the NMW since its introduction have led to further increases in the wage 
bill, with the most notable changes coming as a result of the increase in the adult rate 
to £4.10 and the increase in the development rate to £3.50 in March 2001 (Table 2). 
The March 2001 uprating is estimated to have further increased the national wage bill 
by between 0.1 and 0.2 percentage points (Low Pay Commission, 2001a: 92). 
 
* Table 2 Changes in National Minimum Wage rates * 
 
The impact of the introduction of the NMW in April 1999 varied considerably across 
different sectors of the economy (Figure 1). The four broad industry sectors with the 
largest numbers of jobs affected were: Wholesale and Retail (350,000 jobs); Hotels 
and Restaurants (300,000 jobs); Business Services (170,000 jobs); and Health and 
Social Work (160,000 jobs). In the first two of these four sectors – Wholesale and 
Retail and Hotels and Restaurants – affected jobs also represented a high percentage 
of all jobs in the sector: 9 per cent in Wholesale and Retail and 23 per cent in Hotels 
and Restaurants. In Other Services, the percentage was also relatively high, with 12 
per cent of all jobs affected. Across the whole economy, the percentage of jobs 
affected was 6 per cent.  
 
* Figure 1 Numbers and Proportions of Jobs Paid Below 
 National Minimum Wage Rates in April 1998 by Industry * 
 
The introduction of the NMW would naturally have led to an increase in unit labour 
costs had all else remained unchanged. And Figure 1 indicates that, in some 
industries, this increase in unit labour costs could clearly have been substantial. 
                                                 
1 Workers aged under 18 and the self-employed constitute the primary exemptions from the NMW. For 
further information on the detail of the NMW regulations, see Department of Trade and Industry 
(2001a). 
2 Average pay rise estimated by authors from New Earnings Survey data. The consequent rise in 
incomes would, of course, be lower as some of the additional earnings would replace means-tested 
benefit payments.  
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However, in practice, the impact would depend on whether the NMW also had some 
affect on the level of output, which is determined by levels of employment and labour 
productivity.  
 
Under standard assumptions of a perfectly competitive labour market, an increase in 
wages resulting from the introduction of a minimum wage should make it unprofitable 
for firms to continue to employ workers previously earning less than the NMW, 
unless these workers are able to raise their productivity to compensate for the increase 
in costs. An examination of employment trends, whether at a sectoral level (Low Pay 
Commission, 2001a: 38-40) or through micro-data on low-wage workers (Stewart, 
2002), suggests little by way of negative employment effects from the introduction of 
the minimum wage. This in turn suggests that firms affected by the minimum wage 
may have responded by raising levels of labour productivity. Indeed, some evidence 
has emerged from recent quantitative and qualitative research of employers having 
attempted to increase productivity, for example through increased use of technology, 
increased training or changes in work organization (e.g. Bullock et al, 2001: Table 21; 
Low Pay Commission, 2001a: 57; Gilman, 2002: 59).  
 
However, Dolado et al (1996) provide a reminder that labour market imperfections, 
such as monopsony, are equally able to explain the rather muted employment effects 
of the NMW. There is also evidence of product market imperfections, with some 
employers being able to pass on higher costs to consumers in the way of increased 
prices (Bullock et al., 2001: Table 21).  
 
These theoretical and empirical observations therefore imply that the overall effects of 
the NMW on unit labour costs and labour productivity cannot be pre-determined. To 
provide some evidence on this matter, this study compiles aggregate measures of unit 
labour costs and labour productivity in low-paying industries in the UK and examines 
trends in these measures before and after the introduction of the NMW. In summary, 
we find little evidence to suggest that the introduction of the NMW in 1999 provided 
a general boost to labour productivity growth in low-paying sectors, or that it led to a 
general increase in unit labour costs. There is a suggestion that it may have had some 
effect in a small number of sectors, but other causes cannot be discounted.  
 
2. Labour productivity and unit labour costs 
 
Before proceeding further, it will be useful to introduce the standard framework 
within which our measurement and analysis takes place. The concepts that underlay 
the analysis are summarised here. Further details are provided in Section 5.  
 
Labour productivity measures the amount of output produced, on average, over a 
given period for each unit of labour input. In this paper, the output of a particular 
sector of the economy is measured in terms of the value added to material inputs. We 
therefore measure labour productivity in terms of value added per unit of labour input, 
with hours worked forming our preferred measure of labour inputs. In all of our 
analysis, nominal values (e.g. value added) are deflated to real values to permit 
comparison across industries and time periods.  
 
Since the level of output is also a function of capital inputs and the production 
technology (often termed ‘total factor productivity’ or TFP), the growth in labour 
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productivity may be decomposed into: changes in the quality of labour inputs; 
changes in the quantity and quality of capital inputs; and changes in TFP. In practice, 
however, changes in the quality of labour and capital are difficult to isolate and are 
often subsumed within changes in TFP. The resulting decomposition of labour 
productivity growth into changes in the capital- labour ratio (termed ‘capital 
deepening’) and changes in TFP (which includes changes in the quality of labour and 
capital) is achieved in this paper through the method of ‘growth accounting’ (see, for 
example, Jorgenson et al, 1987).  
 
Unit labour costs measure the labour cost of producing each unit of output. In this 
paper, the labour costs incurred in a particular industry over a given period are 
calculated by dividing total employment costs per hour worked by the level of labour 
productivity. There is no natural means of further decomposing changes in unit labour 
costs, except through the decomposition of changes in labour productivity described 
above.  
 
3. Theory of minimum wage effects on labour productivity and unit labour 
costs 
 
3.1. The standard neo-classical model 
 
The standard neo-classical model of the labour market holds that an individual’s wage 
should equal the marginal product of their labour, as wages constitute the individual’s 
reward for their personal contribution to the output of the firm. The introduction of a 
minimum wage leads to an increase in wages of those previously paid below 
minimum. So it is expected that, after the introduction of a statutory minimum, the 
wage of workers previously paid below that minimum will exceed their marginal 
product, all other things equal. The profit-maximising firm will naturally seek to 
address this situation in one way or another.  
 
The standard expectation is that the firm will dismiss any workers whose marginal 
product is below the statutory minimum, substituting capital for labour. Under this 
scenario, as long as the ratio of substitution reflects the relative output elasticities of 
capital and labour, the level of output would remain constant. However, unit labour 
costs would fall, whilst labour productivity would rise, since the same level of output 
would be produced with fewer labour inputs. At the sectoral level, one would expect 
to see a decrease in the quantity of labour input, alongside capital deepening.  
 
There are, of course, a number of alternatives. One is that employers respond by 
improving the quality of their capital. This might occur through the introduction of 
new technology, particularly investment in information and communication 
technologies, which is shown to have brought about considerable improvements in 
output growth in the United States and elsewhere in recent decades (Forth, Mason and 
O’Mahony, 2002). Here, the direction of changes in labour productivity and unit 
labour costs would mirror those resulting from capital deepening.  
 
A further alternative is that changes occur to labour inputs, with workers raising their 
marginal product to account for the wage increase.  
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An increase in workers’ marginal product may occur as a result of effort 
intensification (i.e. an increase in the quantity of labour input per head or per hour), 
which may itself have a number of different causes. On the one hand, intensification 
could be induced by the employer, for example through an increase in the monitoring 
and regulation of effort, which may take the form of reduced work breaks or closer 
supervision. On the other hand, employees may voluntarily increase the quantity of 
labour supplied in response to the additional motivation provided by higher wages, as 
assumed in efficiency wage theory (Rebitzer and Taylor, 1995). If the provision of 
higher wages serves to reduce labour turnover, this would also increase the quantity of 
labour input per head or per hour over a given period as less time would be spent in 
the hiring and induction of new workers.  
 
A further cause of an increase in workers’ marginal product may be an increase in the 
quality of labour input per head or per hour. This may arise from workers previously 
paid below the minimum wage increasing their skills through investment in education 
(Cubitt and Heap, 1999). Under this scenario, the overall level of employment may 
remain unchanged but output would rise in line with labour costs. One would 
therefore expect labour productivity to increase whilst unit labour costs remained 
unchanged.  
 
3.2. Labour market imperfections 
 
Moving away from the standard neo-classical model of the labour market, emphasis 
has recently been placed upon the scope for minimum wage effects to be cushioned 
by imperfections in the labour market. Labour economists have emphasised that 
employers often have some degree of monopsony power in the labour market, which 
may allow them to absorb wage increases at the cost of lower profits (Dolado, 1996; 
Manning, 2001). From a different perspective, readers of industrial relations have 
emphasised the indeterminacy of much of the wage-setting process, which must not 
only set a price for labour but which must also reflect expectations of fairness and 
provide a managerial tool for motivation (Rubery, 1997).  
 
Under these scenarios, where the impact of a minimum wage falls primarily on labour 
costs and profits and has little effect on the organization of production, one would 
expect little resulting impact on productivity, although unit labour costs would be 
expected to rise.  
 
3.3. Product market imperfections 
 
A similar ‘cushion’ may also be present in the product market if employers are able to 
raise the price of goods or services without experiencing a fall in demand. The NMW 
might provide some scope for price increases in the markets for consumer goods and 
services as it can be expected to increase the disposable income of many lower-paid 
workers. However, in the absence of across-the-board price increases, the scope for 
individual employers to raise prices may be limited if demand is highly price-
sensitive. Fixed-price contracts are also commonplace in the market for many low-
skill services such as security or cleaning. Indeed, the Low Pay Commission has 
observed no obvious NMW effects in sectoral price indices (Low Pay Commission, 





It is also apparent that much of the standard theoretical consideration of minimum 
wage effects is based upon the assumption of a single minimum which has universal 
coverage and which is also universally observed. Yet there are numerous routes 
through which employers may either ameliorate, or wholly avoid, the effect of a 
minimum wage.  
 
One such is to increase the proportion of younger employees, specifically 18-21 year 
olds, who qualify for a lower minimum, or 16-17 year olds who are not covered. 
Another form of labour substitution is to shift from providing contracts of 
employment to acquiring services under contracts with individual suppliers: self-
employment is not covered by the NMW. There are indications that some age-related 
substitution has taken place in the hairdressing sector, and that some home-workers 
have been encouraged to redesignate themselves as self-employed, but the overall 
incidence of either type of restructuring is considered to be minimal (Low Pay 
Commission, 2000: 32). 
 
Employers may also seek to build performance-related bonuses into basic pay. Or 
they may seek to make compensatory changes in other terms and conditions. Such 
compensatory changes might include reductions in overtime premia, the abolition of 
paid meal breaks or new arrangements to ensure that tips are paid direct to the 
employer for distribution through the payroll. In these instances, the NMW may raise 
basic wages whilst having little effect on total remuneration (and thus total costs). 
Again, there is some evidence of this having taken place, but to only a minor degree 
(Low Pay Commission, 1999).  
 
Finally, it is also possible that employers may seek to avoid compliance with the 
minimum wage. The Inland Revenue has identified substantial numbers of employers 
that are not complying with the NMW (3,200 between April 1999 and February 
2001), but these represent only a small proportion of all employers (around 0.2 per 
cent) (Low Pay Commission, 2001b). There is no reliable indicator of the extent to 
which non-compliance varies by industry sector. Anecdotal evidence of non-
compliance has emerged to some degree in all sectors, as one might expect. But there 




From this brief discussion, it is again clear that the impact of the NMW on labour 
productivity and unit labour costs cannot easily be pre-determined. There is a great 
deal of complexity in the combination of employee and employer circumstances that 
lead someone to be paid low wages. And there are a number of reasons why simple 
models may fail to explain the outcomes of a NMW.  
 
In practice, the effects of the introduction of the NMW may be a mixture of all of the 
factors mentioned in the preceding discussion, such that no one element is clearly 
discernible. Yet the Low Pay Commission anticipated that one means whereby firms 
might accommodate the introduction of the NMW, and its affect on labour costs, 
would be through improvements in productive efficiency (Low Pay Commission, 
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1998: 107-10). In the next section, we consider the evidence emerging from existing 
studies.  
 
4. Evidence of minimum wage effects on labour productivity 
 
A variety of quantitative and qualitative evidence has been collected in order to gauge 
the responses made by firms to the introduction of the NMW. This evidence supports 
the assertion made at the end of the previous section, namely that there have been a 
wide range of different responses. Some of these will have a bearing on measures of 
labour productivity and unit labour costs, whilst others will not.  
 
A survey conducted by the Low Pay Commission in September-October 1999, some 6 
months after the introduction of the NMW, suggested that: around one third of firms 
affected by the NMW had made significant efforts to tighten control over labour 
costs; one quarter had made significant changes to the organization of work; and 
around one tenth had significantly increased their use of technology (Low Pay 
Commission, 2000: Fig 3.8). A similar pattern of responses emerged from a second 
survey conducted one year later (Low Pay Commission, 2001a: 122). On its visits to 
individual employers, the Commission also identified examples of firms taking action 
to improve their productivity (Low Pay Commission, 2000: 28).  
 
Below, we consider the evidence at a sectoral level (where available) in order to 
identify those sectors where we may be most likely to observe additional growth in 
labour productivity or TFP as a result of the NMW.  
 
Retail is the sector with the largest number of employees affected by the NMW. In a 
Low Pay Commission survey of members of the Retail Trade Alliance in 1999, 
almost two-thirds reported wage bill rises of 5 per cent or more, but in only 15 per 
cent of cases was this impact greater than 10 per cent (Low Pay Commission, 2000: 
Table A5.3). Nevertheless, small retailers in particular tend to suffer from price 
sensitivity and from strong competition from the larger retailers. In the Low Pay 
Commission survey, most retail employers that had been affected by the NMW (90 
per cent) had responded by cutting profits (Low Pay Commission, 2000: Table A5.7). 
However, substantial proportions had also responded by reducing staffing (61 per 
cent), reducing working hours (60 per cent), changing the way work was organized 
(64 per cent) or tightening control of labour costs (69 per cent) (Tables A5.6 and 
A5.7). Some had also increased their use of technology (39 per cent). Even so, in 
most of these cases, many employers reported that changes were ‘slight’ rather than 
‘significant’.  
 
Hospitality had the second largest number of workers affected by the NMW, after 
Retail. But it is a diverse sector. A Low Pay Commission survey of members of the 
British Hospitality Association indicated that there had been no impact for around on 
quarter of employers. Some 10 per cent had seen wage bill rises of more than 10 
percentage points. The Low Pay Commission survey suggested that slightly fewer 
Hospitality employers had cut profits than in Retail, but the proportion doing so was 
still around three quarters (Low Pay Commission, 2000: Table A5.7). Similarly, fewer 
employers were making productivity related changes. Some 39 per cent had reduced 
staffing, 40 per cent had reduced working hours, 49 per cent had changed the way 
work was organized, and 61 had tightened control of labour costs. Only 26 per cent 
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had increased their use of technology. And again, many said that the changes they had 
made were ‘slight’.  
 
Cleaning and Security were not included in the Low Pay Commission surveys, but 
they were covered by a separate survey of small businesses (Bullock et al, 2001). 
Employers in these industries are expected to have had transitional difficulties in 
passing on wage costs to customers, because of the prevalence of fixed-term 
contracts. Yet Bullock’s survey (2001) suggested that price rises were among the 
dominant responses in these sectors, alongside reductions in profits and increased cost 
control. There is little suggestion that there may have been an increase in the 
substitution of capital for labour or of an increase in the provision of training. 
 
Finally, in textile industries, the major impact of the NMW is considered to have been 
felt in clothing and footwear rather than in textile manufacture (Hayes and Gray, 
2001: 87; Low Pay Commission, 2000: Fig 4.8). But pay rises have been 
accommodated in industry agreements, and thus introduced in a phased manner. 
Undy’s research (1999) suggests only a minor impact outside small unorganized 
firms, since pre-existing incentive systems meant that most employees in larger firms 
already earned above the NMW. But there is evidence of work intensification (Heyes 
and Gray, 2001: Table 7). However, the general view is that the impact of the NMW 
is of secondary importance to other trends affecting employment and output in the 
sector, such as the rise of international competition from developing countries.  
 
Consequently, from the available evidence, it appears that one may be most likely to 
witness an impact on productivity or unit labour costs in sectors such as Retail, where 
considerable proportions of employers have been undertaking productivity-related 
initiatives, or in Cleaning and Security where the NMW has had a substantial impact 
on the wage bill but other options (such as price rises) may be limited. However, the 
evidence for any of these sectors is rather limited in quantity.  
 
5. The methodology of our study 
 
In this study, we compile sectoral measures of the levels of labour productivity and 
unit labour costs (primarily at SIC(92) Group level) on an annual basis over the period 
1995-2000. We use these measures to describe changes in the levels of labour 
productivity and unit labour costs in low-paying sectors over this period, the latter 
part of which saw the introduction of a NMW. The trends that we observe in low-
paying sectors are compared with the trends in higher-paying sectors. We also 
decompose changes in labour productivity in order to separately identify changes in 
the ratio of capital to labour and changes in TFP.  
 
To accompany this descriptive analysis, we also conduct statistical analysis of labour 
productivity growth, using the variation in the impact of the NMW on sectoral wage 
bills to more robustly assess whether any element of labour productivity growth can 
be linked to the introduction of the NMW. This method is analogous to that used by 
Card and Krueger to study the employment effects of changes to the minimum wage 
in the United States (Card, 1992a; Card and Krueger, 1994). In their studies, they take 
advantage of the variation in the impact of the minimum wage across states (Card, 




At the outset, however, we must acknowledge that the impact of the NMW on labour 
productivity is expected to be small, since only a minority of employers affected by 
the NMW (and thus a small minority of all employers) are thought to have adopted 
changes in work organization as a result of its introduction. Moreover, if it is possible 
to observe a change in labour productivity growth in low-paying sectors around the 
time of the introduction of the NMW, we can expect that it will be difficult to make a 
robust, causal association with the NMW. There are many changes in a firm’s internal 
and external environments, besides regulatory changes, that may affect overall levels 
of labour productivity and unit labour costs.  
 
5.1. Deriving sectoral estimates of labour productivity and unit labour costs 
 
The principal data source for our analysis is the Annual Business Inquiry (ABI) which 
provides sectoral data on economic outputs and inputs for UK businesses over the 
period 1995-2000.3 The ABI covers SIC(92) Divisions 10-93 inclusive, with the 
exception of Divisions 65-67 (Financial Services) and 75 (Public Administration). 
Other exceptions comprise public sector activities in Divisions 80 (Education) and 95 
(Health and Social Work).  
 
The exclusion of Agriculture (Division 1) is particularly notable, given the low rates 
of pay that exist within that industry. However, the continued operation of the 
Agricultural Wages Boards means that the impact of the introduction of the NMW 
was not as great as in other low-paying sectors (Low Pay Commission, 1998, Fig 7.1). 
It should also be noted that the ABI covers only those UK businesses registered for 
VAT and PAYE. The ABI does not therefore cover small, non-registered companies, 
which may have over-representation of low pay. Such businesses are likely to be 
numerous, but account for only a small proportion of all employment in the UK. 
Further details on the ABI are provided by Jones (2000).  
 
In addition to its lack of coverage of certain sectors, problems also arise with the 
calculation of labour productivity and labour cost measures in some industries. 
National Statistics advise against the compilation of value-added measures for 
Division 70 (Real Estate), since these measures will exclude capital expenditure 
(Daffin and Lau, 2002). They also advise against compiling estimates for Divisions 80 
and 85 in view of the ABI’s partial coverage of activity in these sectors as mentioned 
earlier. Consequently, we have excluded these sectors from our database. The 
principal implication is that we are unable to comment on the Residential Care sector 
(SIC(92) Class 85.31). Nonetheless, a detailed investigation of this sector has been 
undertaken elsewhere using firm-level data (Machin, Manning and Rahman, 2002). 
That study finds no robust evidence that the introduction of the NMW raised levels of 
productivity in the sector.4  
 
We have chosen to analyse the ABI primarily at SIC(92) Group level. However, we 
have disaggregated Division 93 to Class level in order to separately Class 93.02 
(Hairdressing and Other Beauty Treatments). Our final dataset contains information 
                                                 
3 We use the latest available version of the ABI data, released by National Statistics on 12th June 2002. 
This version incorporates final estimates for the year 2000 and some revisions to earlier estimates for 
other years.  
4 No comment is made about changes in unit labour costs.  
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for 183 industries in total although, because of missing values on some data items, 
only 167 of these contain complete information on all relevant data items across all 
five years.  
 
The industry- level data provided in the official release of the ABI has been 
augmented with a number of other data items. The first of these is an estimate of year-
average employment within each industry, provided directly to us by National 
Statistics. These data are preferable to the point- in-time employment estimates 
provided in the official release of the ABI. They constitute the measure of labour 
inputs used by Daffin and Lau (2002) in their calculations of labour productivity 
using the ABI.  
 
To these estimates of year-average employment, we have added annual estimates of 
hours worked per head within each industry, derived from the Quarterly Labour 
Survey, in order to provide estimates of total hours worked.5 Hours worked represent 
a better measure of the quantity of labour inputs than persons employed, particularly 
in industries with substantial degrees of part-time working. The Quarterly Labour 
Force Survey has also been used to obtain information on changing skill levels within 
each industry over time (skills being proxied by the level of educational 
qualificiations). This provides us with a crude indicator of changes in labour quality.  
 
In Table 3 we present some estimates of nominal gross valued-added per job, summed 
across the 167 industry sectors for which we have complete information on labour 
productivity and its components and on unit labour costs over the period 1995-2000. 
These compare well with the estimates provided by National Statistics for the period 
1998-2000 (Daffin and Lau, 2002). The levels of labour productivity obtained from 
our database are inevitably slightly smaller than the official estimates since we 
exclude 16 industry sectors with missing values on any of our variables. But the 
trends across time, shown by index numbers, are very similar.  
 
* Table 3 Gross value-added per job at current prices, £ thousand * 
 
 
5.2. Decomposing the growth in labour productivity (growth accounting) 
 
Taking a simple production function, the level of output (real value added, V) from 
industry j at time t can be expressed as a function of aggregate capital inputs (K), 
aggregate labour inputs (L) and the production technology (A): 
 
Vjt = f(Kjt, Ljt) * Ajt           (1) 
 
where the values of capital and labour inputs (K and L respectively) are determined 
by both quantity and quality considerations. The production technology (A) refers to 
the rate at which units of capital and labour are converted into output and is often 
termed ‘total factor productivity’ (TFP). 
 
The growth in output in industry j over the period (t,t-1) will therefore be determined 
by changes in labour inputs, changes in capital inputs and changes in TFP. Growth in 
                                                 
5 The Labour Force Survey is preferred to the New Earnings Survey as a source of data on hours 
worked for the reasons stated by Williams (2002).  
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output may be measured at a sectoral level from official data sources, as may changes 
in the quantities of labour and capital inputs (see Section 5.1 above). Changes in the 
quality of capital and labour are more difficult to measure. In addition, it is not 
possible to directly estimate changes in TFP. This problem is addressed by the 
traditional growth accounting method, which has its theoretical underpinnings in the 
neoclassical growth model.  
 
Under the assumption that all markets function perfectly, the method of growth 
accounting method permits changes in TFP to be estimated as a residual having 
subtracted changes in inputs from output growth. The most commonly employed 
index formula is based on the assumption of a Translog production function and 
obtained via the Törnqvist discrete approximation to the Divisia index (see, for 
example, Jorgenson et al, 1987). If we let i denote industries and  dXi (t) denote the 
proportionate change in variable Xi  between period t and t-1,  
 i.e. dXi (t) = Ln (Xjt / Xjt-1), and impose constant returns to scale then the Törnqvist 
index is given by  
 
dVj (t) = a j (t,t-1)*dLj (t) + (1 - aj (t,t-1))*dKj (t) + dAj (t) (2) 
 
where a(t,t-1) is the share of labour in value-added, averaged over the two time 
periods. Under neo-classical assumptions, the shares a(t,t-1) and (1- a(t,t-1)) equal the 
output elasticity of labour and capital respectively and since we are assuming constant 
returns to scale, sum to one. The rate of change in Aj (t) is a catch-all for 
technological or organizational improvements, such as process innovations and 
changes in work organization, that increase the level of output for a given amount of 
input.  Changes in the quality of factor inputs, e.g. a greater use of new technology 
equipment or highly skilled labour, may be incorporated within this framework by 
weighting each of a number of types of capital or labour by their value added shares 
(see e.g. Jorgenson et al. 1987 for details).6 If this adjustment for quality is not carried 
out directly then the TFP term also includes the impact of input quality changes. 
 
This method of accounting for growth in output can be easily extended to permit a 
focus on changes in labour productivity. Having identified the impact of changes in 
the quantity of labour input (say hours worked), we can subtract this from the changes 
in output in (2), and using the fact that the input weights sum to one, derive a labour 
productivity equation of the form:  
 
d(Vj /Lj )(t)  = (1 - aj (t,t-1))*d(K j / Lj )(t)  + dAj (t)  (3) 
  
Thus changes in labour productivity depend on changes in the capital labour ratio 
(capital deepening) and TFP.  
 
An alternative approach is to start with gross output (gross value added plus 
purchases) and include purchases as intermediate inputs in the above formulae. 
Although this approach is considered in theory to be the most appropriate measure as 
it allows for substitution between material and other inputs, in practice reliable 
                                                 
6 It is not appropriate to make such a labour quality adjustment in our circumstances since the 
underlying assumption, that the price of labour equates to its marginal product, is unlikely to hold both 
immediately before and immediately after the introduction of the NMW.  
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materials deflators are not available. However some experiments with this measure 
were carried out in the context of regression analysis (see below).     
 
5.3. Unit labour costs: 
 
As we have provided a formal exposition of our measure of labour productivity, it 
appropriate to do the same for our measure of unit labour costs.  
 
Unit labour costs measure the labour cost of producing each unit of output. Unit 
labour costs in industry j at time t (ULCjt) are calculated by dividing total employment 
costs per unit of labour input (Cjt / Ljt) by the level of labour productivity (Vjt / Ljt):  
 
UCLjt = (Cjt / Ljt) / (Vjt / Ljt)        (4) 
 
Equation (4) serves to illustrate that unit labour costs are determined both by changes 
in compensation per head/per hour and changes in labour productivity. However, 
since the amount of labour input appears in both the numerator and denominator, 
trends in unit labour costs may equally be measured by trends in labour’s share of 
value added:  
 
UCLjt = (Cjt / Vjt)         (5) 
 
 
5.4. Panel regressions 
 
An alternative to the index number approach is to employ regression analysis both to 
estimate the input weights and/or to facilitate testing for impacts of the minimum 
wage. This can be carried out using either the labour productivity equation above or 
by estimating TFP using the Törnqvist index and then regressing the results on the 
variables of interest. In standard panel regression analysis two basic models are used 
in production function estimation. The first regresses the (log) levels of output on 
explanatory variables including industry dummy variables (industry fixed effects) to 
account for industry heterogeneity in output levels. The second takes the first 
difference of all variables so that these industry fixed effects fall out of the equation. 
The latter saves on degrees of freedom and is most useful when the cross section 
dimension is large relative to the time dimension. The data set employed in the 
regressions below is based on 181 industries and six years so the first difference 
model is preferred. In fact the fixed effects model led to unstable results due to the 
need to estimate such a large number of industry parameters.  
 
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function, we estimate the following two 
equations,: 
 
d (Vj /Lj )(t)  = C + a*d (Kj / Lj )(t)  + Sjb j Zj + g NMW + e (t)  (6) 
   
dAj (t) = C + Sjb j Zj + g NMW + e (t)     (7) 
 
where Zj is a vector of j control variables and NMW is a variable measuring the 
impact of the national minimum wage, discussed in the next section. Candidates for 
control variables include proportions of the work force with various skill levels, 
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investment in new technology and time trends to capture cyclical effects. The impact 
of these variables is discussed in the context of the panel regression results below.     
 
5.5. Identifying low-paying sectors 
 
A critical part of our study is the identification of sectors most affected by the 
introduction of the NMW. Figure 1 shows that SIC(92) Section G (Wholesale and 
Retail) has the largest number of employees paid below the NMW prior to its 
introduction. However, Figure 1 also shows that the proportion of low paid employees 
is higher in other industries, most notably Section H (Hotels and Restaurants).  
 
Either of these indicators – the number or proportion of employees affected – could be 
used to measure the impact of the introduction of the NMW. However, a more direct 
indicator of the ‘bite’ of the NMW would be provided by a measure of the 
proportionate change in sectoral employment costs arising directly from the 
introduction of the NMW. Ideally, such a measure would cover total employment 
costs, comprising the sum of wage payments and National Insurance contributions 
minus any compensatory effect arising from the withdrawal of non-pecuniary 
rewards. For reasons of simplification however, we follow the Low Pay Commission 
(2001a) in focusing solely on the impact of the NMW on the wage bill.  
 
Estimates of the impact of the introduction of the NMW on sectoral wage bills are 
presented for a small number of low-paid sectors in the Low Pay Commission’s third 
report (Low Pay Commission, 2001a: Figure 3.27). These estimates are obtained from 
the 1998 New Earnings Survey by uprating the gross wages of all low-paid employees 
to the level of the NMW, assuming full compliance with the new minimum. A 
comparison of mean wages in each sector before and after the NMW adjustment 
provides an estimate of the impact on each sector’s wage bill.  
 
We have adopted the same methodology to estimate the impact of the introduction of 
the NMW on the wage bill within each of our 183 industries. In doing so, we have not 
taken into account any possible ‘spill-over’ effect on the wages of higher paid 
workers which might occur through attempts to restore differentials. The available 
evidence suggests that any such spill-over effects have been minimal (Low Pay 
Commission, 2002: 21-24). The method also ignores the cost of anticipatory wage 
rises by employers that took place before the April 1998 (the date of fieldwork for the 
1998 New Earnings Survey). However, since the Low Pay Commission did not 
publish their recommendations for the rates at which the NMW should be introduced 
until June 1998, the degree of such pre-emptive action by employers is considered to 
be small.  
 
Figure 2 shows the estimated impact of the introduction of the NMW on the wage bill 
in seven industry sectors that are commonly highlighted by the Low Pay Commission. 
Four of these seven sectors – Textiles, Clothing and Footwear, Retail, and Hospitality 
– represent collections of SIC(92) Groups, whilst the remaining three sectors – 
Cleaning, Security and Hairdressing – are defined at Group level in line with our 
database. There is a degree of variation in the impact of the NMW within the 
agglomerated sectors. Within Hospitality, for example, the impact is estimated to be 
around 2.6 per cent in Restaurants (SIC(92) Group 55.3) compared with 1.2 per cent 
in Hotels (Group 55.1). Yet, whilst much of our descriptive analysis does focus on the 
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seven sectors shown in Figure 2, any Group- level variation within the four 
agglomerated sectors will be picked up in our panel regressions.  
 
* Figure 2 Impact on the Sectoral Wage Bill of the Introduction of the NMW, Low 
Pay Commission Sectors *  
 
Of course, these seven sectors and their Group- level components are not the only 
sectors in the economy in which the NMW is estimated to have had a noticeable 
impact on the wage bill. Figure 3 shows the estimated impact in a number of other 
low-paying sectors. These include Other Computer-Related Activities (Group 72.6), 
Sporting Activities (Group 92.6) and Other Recreational Activities (Group 92.7). An 
examination of the impact of the NMW on the wage bill in each of the 183 Group-
level industries in our database shows that the six sectors shown in Figure 3 each sit 
well above the 75th percentile, represented by an increase in the sectoral wage bill of 
0.32%.  
 
* Figure 3 Impact on the Sectoral Wage Bill of the Introduction of the NMW, Other 





Our investigation of the impact of the NMW on labour productivity and unit labour 
costs begins with a descriptive analysis of trends in productivity and unit labour costs 
over the period 1995-2000. To provide a framework for the discussion of this 
descriptive analysis, we first focus on seven sectors that are commonly highlighted by 
the Low Pay Commission (see Figure 2). In doing so, we attempt to identify any 
obvious deviations from trend that might suggest an impact from the NMW. 
However, it will be difficult to judge whether anything that we observe among these 
seven sectors is unique to them alone, and so we continue by investigating whether 
the trends seen in low-paying sectors as a whole are divergent from those seen in 
higher paying sectors.  We do so by grouping the 167 industries with complete data 
into four quartiles according to the magnitude of the impact of the NMW on their 
sectoral wage bill. In this way, we obtain a more comprehensive indication of whether 
trends in labour productivity and unit labour costs across a range of sectors appear to 
be related to the bite of the NMW.  
 
We follow our descriptive analysis with statistical analysis of the relationship between 
labour productivity growth / unit labour  costs and the bite of the NMW. This first 
takes the form of an analysis of the strength of any correlation between labour 
productivity growth / unit labour costs and the bite of the NMW. In the case of labour 
productivity growth, these correlations are also accompanied by panel regressions of 
the form described in Section 5.4 above.  
 
Our discussion of labour productivity growth is presented in Section 6.1 below. Our 
discussion of unit labour costs follows in Section 6.2.  
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6.1. Labour Productivity Growth 
 
Figure 4 shows the level of labour productivity (measured in terms of real value added 
per hour worked) in each of the seven sectors commonly highlighted by the Low Pay 
Commission. The graph shows that the level of labour productivity increased in all 
seven sectors over the period 1995-2000, with the exception of Clothing and 
Footwear which saw a small net decline. However, there does not appear to be an 
obvious and consistent increase in the growth rate across all other sectors after 1998 
which might be attributed to the introduction of the NMW.  
 
On closer inspection, we see that the rate of growth in labour productivity did increase 
after 1998 in three sectors, namely Retail, Security and Hairdressing. The rate of 
growth also increased in Textiles after 1999. Figure 5 shows the average annual rate 
of growth in labour productivity in the period preceding the introduction of the NMW 
(1995-1998) and in the period that included and followed its introduction (1998-
2000). For each of the seven sectors, the graph is effectively comparing the average 
annual rate of growth over the period January 1995-December 1998 with that over the 
period January 1999-December 2000. The graph helps to clarify that there was an 
acceleration in the rate of growth in labour productivity in Textiles, Security and 
Hairdressing. In Retail, the rate of growth between 1998-2000 was clearly greater 
than that seen over the period 1996-1998 (Figure 4). But once the earlier period is 
extended to include 1995, Figure 5 shows a slight deceleration in growth for Retail in 
1998-2000. In Hospitality, we see an increase in the level of labour productivity 
growth in both periods, but a deceleration in the rate of growth in the period covered 
by the NMW. The two remaining sectors, Clothing and Footwear and Cleaning both 
show slight declines in the level of labour productivity in the period covered by the 
NMW.  
 
In summary, if the introduction of the NMW had any effect on overall labour 
productivity in the seven low-paying sectors, this effect seems most likely to have 
been witnessed in Textiles, Security and Hairdressing.  
 
Textiles is a shrinking sector of the economy but, over the period in question, saw an 
acceleration in labour productivity growth as a result of the rate of decline in labour 
inputs exceeding the rate of decline in output. The rate of decline in real value added 
rose from -1.5 per cent per annum in 1995-1998 to -8.2 per cent per annum in 1998-
2000. But the rate of decline in hours worked rose to a greater extent, from -2.3 per 
cent per annum in 1995-1998 to -10.6 per cent per annum in 1998-2000.  
 
Security and Hairdressing, in contrast, are growing sectors of the economy. In 
Security, the acceleration in labour productivity growth over the period covering the 
introduction of the NMW arose because the rate of growth in labour inputs fell 
markedly, from 10.3 per cent per annum in 1995-1998 to 1.6 per cent per annum in 
1998-2000, whilst the rate of growth in real value added showed only a marginal 
slowdown, from 12.1 per cent to 8 per cent per annum. In Hairdressing, the opposite 
was true, since the rate of growth in real value added accelerated whilst growth in 
labour inputs remained steady. Growth in real value added in Hairdressing rose from 
3.8 per cent per annum 1995-1998 to 10.2 per cent per annum 1998-2000, but the rate 
of growth in hours worked rose from 2.6 per cent to only 3.6 per cent.  
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To further understand the origins of the observed changes in labour productivity 
growth in these sectors, we use the method of growth accounting to decompose the 
growth in labour productivity into that part which is attributable to the substitution of 
capital for labour and that part which is due to other changes, which we collectively 
refer to as growth in TFP.  
 
In Figure 6 we see Textiles has the highest ratio of capital to labour among the seven 
sectors currently under consideration. This might indicate that production methods in 
Textiles also offer greater scope for the further substitution of capital for labour than 
do the methods used in very labour intensive sectors such as Security, Cleaning and 
Hairdressing. Indeed, we can see that the capital- labour ratio in Textiles has increased 
in both periods (1995-1998 and 1998-2000) (Figure 6), and that the rate of 
substitution has actually increased in the later period (Figure 7). This increased rate of 
substitution of capital for labour enables the number of hours worked in Textiles to 
fall at a faster rate than real value added. This clearly provides a basis for an increase 
in labour productivity growth within the sector. In fact, it would appear to wholly 
account for the acceleration in productivity growth in Textiles, since there has been a 
decline in TFP in the period covered by the NMW (Figures 8 and 9).  
 
The decomposition of labour productivity growth in Security shows a similar picture 
to that emerging from Textiles (Figure 10). There has been some substitution of 
capital for labour in Security over the period 1998-2000, reversing the trend seen in 
the earlier period. And this substitution of capital for labour would appear to account 
for the acceleration of productivity growth in the sector, since TFP has been declining 
since 1997. In Hairdressing, labour inputs have been growing faster than capital 
inputs, leading to a slight decline in the capital- labour ratio. Productivity growth has 
therefore accelerated within this sector as a result of an increase in the rate of growth 
in TFP.  
 
The causes of the acceleration in the growth rate of TFP in Hairdressing are less 
obvious. One possibility is that there has been an increase in labour quality in the 
sector. Estimates from the Labour Force Survey of the proportion of employees in the 
sector with varying levels of qualifications does appear to suggest that there has been 
some increase in the skill levels of those employed in Hairdressing. Specifically, the 
proportion of employees with qualifications at NVQ level 4 and above has risen from 
around 3 per cent in 1995-1999 to 6 per cent in 2000, with a corresponding fall in the 
proportion of employees in qua lifications at NVQ levels 1-3. However, on its own 
this could not be expected to account for the sharp rise in TFP between 1998 and 
2000. One would therefore expect that there has either been an increase in the quality 
of the capital stock, an improvement in work organization or, perhaps most likely, an 
intensification of effort per hour at given levels of skill.  
 
To summarize the results for these seven sectors, there has been an acceleration in 
labour productivity growth in Textiles, Security and Hairdressing over the period 
covered by the NMW. In Textiles and Security, this has been achieved through the 
substitution of capital for labour. In Hairdressing, it has been achieved through other 
means, with an increase in the share of skilled labour appearing to have played a 
minor part but the major causes remaining unexplained.  
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It is notable that two of the three sectors which have experienced an acceleration in 
labour productivity growth are ones in which the NMW is estimated to have had a 
relatively large impact on the sectoral wage bill, namely Cleaning and Hairdressing. 
Otherwise, there is no obvious relationship between trends in labour productivity 
shown in Figures 4 and 5 and the impact of the NMW shown in Figure 2. However, a 
more systematic investigation of this potential relationship would involve the 
consideration of a broader set of low paying sectors, and would also consider trends in 
labour productivity in sectors that were relatively unaffected by the NMW. To 
undertake such an investigation, we divide the group of 167 industries with complete 
information into four groups according to the degree of impact that the NMW had on 
the sectoral wage bill. The dividing lines between the four groups are set at the 25th, 
50th and 75th percentiles of the distribution of wage bill impacts.7 Those industries 
coming within the first quartile are therefore those in which the NMW had the least 
impact on the wage bill, whilst those coming in the fourth quartile are the sectors in 
which the NMW had the greatest impact.  
 
Trends in labour productivity within each of these four quartiles over the period 1995-
200 are shown in Figure 11. The graph shows clearly that levels of labour 
productivity are positively correlated with wage levels, such that higher levels of 
labour productivity are seen in those sectors least affected by the NMW. These are 
also the most capital intensive sectors (Figure 13).  
 
Each of the four quartiles show some growth in labour productivity over the period 
1998-2000, with the fastest growth occurring in the first quartile. The NMW has little 
impact here and so it is more fruitful to focus on quartiles three and four. Here, we see 
that the growth in labour productivity in the fourth quartile was faster than in the third 
quartile over the period 1998-2000 (Figures 11 and 12). But the same was also true in 
over the period 1995-1998, before the introduction of the NMW. Moreover, the rate 
of growth in labour productivity actually decreased in the later period in both quartiles 
(Figure 12). As a result, it seems difficult to argue that any differential in growth rates 
between the third and fourth quartiles over the period 1998-2000 is due to the NMW.  
 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to consider the differences in the causes of labour 
productivity growth within each of the quartiles. The first quartile shows an 
increasing substitution of capital for labour in the period 1998-2000 (Figures 13 and 
14) and a slight acceleration in the rate of growth in TFP (Figures 15 and 16). Both 
factors have therefore contributed to the growth in labour productivity over the period 
1998-2000 and to the acceleration in the rate of growth in this period compared with 
1995-1998 (Figure 17). In the remaining three quartiles, the substitution of capital for 
labour alone is has driven the growth in labour productivity over the period 1998-
2000. The fourth quartile in particular shows a substantial degree of capital deepening 
over the period covering the introduction of the NMW, but only a slight acceleration 
in the rate of substitution, indicating that it forms part of a longer term trend rather 
than having arisen as a response to regulatory changes. In each of the bottom three 
quartiles, a deceleration in the rate of growth of TFP over the period 1998-2000 was 
sufficient to slow down the rate of productivity growth when compared with the 
earlier period.  
                                                 
7 The 25th percentile corresponds to a wage bill impact of 0.04 per cent; the 50th percentile to an impact 
of 0.13 per cent and the 75th percentile to an impact of 0.32 per cent.  
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Thus far, our investigation has provided little evidence that the introduction of the 
NMW had a general impact on labour productivity growth in low-paying sectors. To 
verify this conclusion we move from a descriptive to a more analytical approach 
which takes the individual industry sectors in our database as the unit of analysis. This 
involves, first, an examination at the sectoral level of the correlation between the 
wage bill impact of the NMW the rate of growth in labour productivity. Second, it 
involves panel regressions of the form described in Section 5.4.  
 
Table 4 presents the correlations between the estimated wage bill impact of the NMW 
in each sector and that sector’s rate of growth in labour productivity, calculated over a 
range of periods and for a number of different sub-samples of the 183 industries in 
our database.  The first row of the table presents the coefficients that arise when the 
correlations are calculated across all 183 industries. We see that a small positive 
correlation falls almost to zero in the period covering the introduction of the NMW. 
This indicates that the rate of growth in labour productivity across our 183 industries 
is unrelated to the ‘bite’ of the NMW.  
 
One might argue, however, that any impact is being masked by the changes in labour 
productivity that have taken place in higher-paying sectors where the introduction of 
the NMW was at most a very minor issue. Yet the pattern is almost unchanged when 
we restrict our attention to those 87 industries in quartiles three and four of the 
distribution of wage bill impacts. Restricting our attention further to those 42 
industries in quartile four, we see that the correlation coefficients remain extremely 
small and continues to decrease in size over time. The same is true when we focus 
solely on the 24 SIC(92) Groups that comprise the seven sectors most commonly 
highlighted by the Low Pay Commission. Those sectors most affected by the NMW 
appear to have experienced slightly faster productivity growth than higher-paying 
sectors in the few years preceding the NMW, but this small positive association 
disappears over the period when the NMW was actually conceived and introduced.  
 
To evaluate the significance of these correlations we first regressed labour 
productivity, total factor productivity and the capital labour ratio on the wage bill 
impact variable and year dummy variables to account for cyclical effects. The results 
are shown in Table 5 for the time periods 1995-1998 and 1998-2000.  In the earlier 
period the wage impact variable is significant in the TFP equation and in the labour 
productivity equation at the 90 per cent level. In the later period these effects 
disappear, with the coefficients turning negative although with a very low level of 
significance. The growth in the capital labour ratio is not related to the wage impact 
variable in either time period.    
 
We now turn to panel regressions controlling for a range of other influences on 
industry productivity growth. Obvious candidates were skill proportions of the work 
force and new technology equipment (labour and capital quality variables). In the case 
of the former we included two skill distinctions, higher skilled (degree and above and 
other NVQ4) and intermediate (NVQ1-3). Data on new technology equipment was 
not available for the industry detail considered in this study. Instead we experimented 
with using sector level (approximately 2-digit SIC) shares of Information and 
Communications Technology (ICT) equipment in total capital but these turned out to 
be insignificant. In addition to overall year dummies we also constructed time trends 
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which were broad sector specific, i.e. manufacturing, other production industries and 
service sectors. These again turned out to be insignificant. Therefore the final 
specification included only labour force skills as controls. 
 
The results are shown in Table 6. The first three columns show the results when the 
wage impact variable was included for each year, whereas the second three columns 
show the impact when this variable is only included from 1988-2000. Note this 
variable does not change over time so that it is not possible to include it together with 
a time interaction effect. The results confirm the findings from the earlier correlations 
that the wage impact variable has a significant impact on productivity for the entire 
period but disappears when attention is restricted to the years after the introduction of 
the minimum wage.  Finally, we also carried out regressions using dependent 
variables based on gross output, with real material inputs as an explanatory variable. 
This yielded similar results on the wage impact variable as for the value-added labour 
productivity and TFP equations, namely a significantly higher productivity growth in 
low wage sectors for the entire period but not post 1998.   
 
In conclusion, the introduction of the NMW may have led to an acceleration in labour 
productivity growth in some sectors, such as Textiles, Security and Hairdressing. 
Nevertheless, there does not appear to have been a general impact (positive or 
negative) on sectoral rates of labour productivity growth at the level of aggregation 
employed in our database (primarily SIC(92) Group level).  
 
6.2. Unit Labour Costs 
 
In the previous section, we observed that the level of labour productivity rose in most 
of the low-paying sectors over the period 1995-2000. The direction of change in unit 
labour costs in these sectors is therefore determined by whether this growth in labour 
productivity was greater than or less than the change in employment costs per hour 
worked.  
 
Figure 18 shows the level of unit labour costs (measured in terms of constant prices) 
in each of the seven sectors commonly highlighted by the Low Pay Commission. The 
graph shows that there was a net increase in the level of unit labour costs in just two 
of these seven sectors over the period 1995-2000, namely Security and Cleaning. Unit 
labour costs in these two sectors were already higher than in the remaining five 
sectors in 1995; the pattern of change served to further increase the disparity. Each of 
the five remaining sectors witnessed marginal net declines in unit labour costs over 
the full period in question.  
 
Focusing on the period covering the introduction of the NMW (1998-2000), we find 
that unit labour costs rose only in Hospitality (Figure 19). However, the rate of 
decline in unit labour costs did slow down in Retail and Hairdressing in this later 
period. In the remaining four sectors – Textiles, Clothing and Footwear, Security and 
Cleaning – unit labour costs declined over the period 1998-2000 after rising between 
1995 and 1998. The reasons for these divergent trends are apparent when we consider 
changes in the components of unit labour costs, namely employment costs per hour 
worked and labour productivity.  
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In the Hospitality sector, employment costs per hour worked rose by 4 per cent per 
annum (at constant prices) over the period 1998-2000. This mirrored the rate of 
growth over the period 1995-1998. However, the rate of growth in labour productivity 
slowed down from 6.2 per cent per annum to 2.6 per cent per annum. As a 
consequence, unit labour costs rose in the period 1998-200 after having declined 
between 1995 and 1998.  
 
The situation in Security was slightly different. Here, employment costs per hour 
worked also grew by around 4 per cent per annum over the period 1998-2000, as they 
had between 1995 and 1998. But labour productivity growth accelerated from 1.8 per 
cent per annum to 6.5 per cent per annum, bringing about a decline in unit labour 
costs. 
 
In Textiles, employment costs per hour worked stopped growing in the period 1998-
2000. Both total employment costs and total hours worked fell by around 11 per cent 
over this period. One reason may be the increased substitution of capital for labour, 
discussed in Section 6.1, although this sector has also witnessed a general decrease in 
size in recent years. Since labour productivity did grow slightly in Textiles between 
1998 and 2000, by 2.4 per cent per annum on average, this led to the decline in unit 
labour costs, which averaged 3.3 per cent per annum.  
 
Finally, in Clothing and footwear and in Cleaning, the fall in unit labour costs was 
brought about by the combination of a fall in employment costs per hour worked and 
almost static levels of labour productivity. Employment costs per hour worked fell by 
5 per cent per annum between 1998 and 2000 in Clothing and footwear, and by 2 per 
cent per annum in Cleaning over the same period. The declines in unit labour costs in 
each sector were of a similar magnitude.  
 
To summarise the patterns emerging from Figures 18 and 19, unit labour costs rose 
only in Hospitality over the period covering introduction of NMW. They fell in four 
of the remaining six sectors, including Security and Cleaning which were two of the 
hardest hit by NMW. The introduction of the NMW does not therefore appear to have 
brought about any general increase in aggregate unit labour costs across these seven 
sectors.  
 
Turning to examine the fortunes of sectors in each of our four quartiles, we find a 
similar lack of evidence that the NMW has brought about a general increase in 
aggregate unit labour costs in low-paying sectors. Figures 20 and 21 show that unit 
labour costs have increased in the second, third and fourth quartiles. However, the 
increase is smallest in the fourth quartile, where the ‘bite’ of the NMW was at its 
greatest. It is true that the trend in labour costs reversed in the fourth quartile when 
compared with the period 1995-1998, which saw a marked decline. But a reversal of a 
similar magnitude was also seen in the second quartile, making it difficult to argue 
that this was caused by the NMW.  
 
These conclusions are bolstered by the results of our correlation analysis. Table 6 
shows very weak correlations between the wage bill impact of the NMW and the 
annual rate of growth in unit labour costs. There is a broad indication that the 
correlation changed from a negative one in the period 1995-1998 to a positive one in 
the period 1998-2000. However, the correlation coefficients do not exceed 0.2 in any 
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of the periods for any of the sub-samples. Consequently, one may conclude that there 
is, at most, a very weak relationship at industry level between the wage bill impact of 
the NMW and changes in unit labour costs.  
 
These correlations represent the final point of our analysis of unit labour costs, since 
there is not an appropriate regression framework for the analysis of growth in unit 
labour costs equivalent to that employed in the case of labour productivity. To 
summarize our results, we find little evidence either from our descriptive analysis or 
our industry- level correlations that the introduction of the NMW brought about a 
general increase in aggregate unit labour costs in low-paying industries. Where 
increases did occur in employment costs per hour worked, these appear to have been 
approximately counterbalanced by labour productivity growth, thereby minimizing 
any resultant impact on unit labour costs.  
 
 
7. Conclusions  
 
In conclusion, we have found little evidence in our analysis to suggest that the 
introduction of the NMW in 1999 provided a general boost to labour productivity 
growth in low-paying sectors, or that it led to a general increase in unit labour costs.  
 
It is true that the NMW may have had some effect in specific sectors. Our descriptive 
analysis of labour productivity growth suggested that the rate of growth did accelerate 
in Textiles, Security and Hairdressing over the period covering the introduction of the 
NMW. But our statistical analysis found no robust association between the wage bill 
impact of the NMW and rates of labour productivity growth across a wider range of 
sectors. Similarly, we found that unit labour costs did rise in Hospitality over the 
period covering the introduction of the NMW. But again our statistical analysis found 
no robust association at a more general level.  
 
There are a number of possible reasons why the NMW appears not to have had the 
impact that some anticipated.  
 
First, the overall impact of the introduction of the NMW on sectoral wage bills is 
generally rather small. Across the 183 industries in our database, the 75th percentile in 
the wage bill distribution was represented by an impact of only 0.32 per cent. 
Moreover, in only 5 of these 183 sectors was the impact greater than 2 per cent 
(Security; Cleaning; Hairdressing; Camping; and Restaurants). It is also clear that this 
aggregate effect will vary considerably across different firms, and that even within 
most low-paying sectors, many firms will have been untouched by the NMW.  
 
Second, it is clear that employers’ responses to the introduction of the NMW took a 
variety of different forms. Many did report taking action to improve levels of labour 
productivity, either by tightening control of labour costs, introducing new technology 
or changing the organization of work.  However, these initiatives were commonly 
combined with other measures, such as increasing prices or cutting profits (Low Pay 
Commission, 2001: 123). The extent of the improvement in productivity may 
therefore have been marginal in many cases.  
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Third, it is also apparent that the ‘bite’ of the NMW would have been felt most 
painfully among small businesses (Low Pay Commission, 1998: 49). Small firms are 
extremely numerous but make only a minor contribution to aggregate levels of 
employment and output. Official statistics suggest that, in the private sector in 1999, 
firms with 1-9 employees accounted for 86 per cent of all firms with 1 or more 
employee, but only 20 per cent of aggregate employment and 19 per cent of aggregate 
turnover (Department of Trade and Industry, 1999). In contrast, firms with 500 or 
more employees accounted for less than 0.5 per cent of all firms, but 45 per cent of 
employment and 43 per cent of turnover. Considerable changes in levels of output, 
hours and employment within small firms can therefore be expected to make a 
relatively small impression on industry- level aggregates.  
 
It is difficult to argue that the introduction of the NMW had no noticeable impact on 
labour productivity and unit labour costs among low-paying employers. However, this 
impact is likely to have been most apparent in firms with substantial proportions of 
low-paid employees and with limited opportunities to make other responses, perhaps 
because they operate in extremely price-sensitive markets or have very low profit 
margins. These are likely to form only a small proportion of all firms in any one 
sector.  
 
It may be possible to identify such employers in firm or establishment-level datasets.  
One obvious candidate would be the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey 
(WERS98) which, although it lacks data on output levels and employment costs, has 
the potential to be linked to returns made by the same employers as part of the Annual 
Business Inquiry. A similar matching process might also be attempted using the Low 
Pay Commission’s survey of employers undertaken in September-October 1999. 
However, the relatively low response rate achieved in the Low Pay Commission 
survey, and its limited range of control variables, appear to limit its potential in 
comparison with WERS98.  
 
A further avenue of interest is the potential for productivity gains arising from the 
recent uprating of the NMW in October 2002. The Low Pay Commission estimate 
that between 1.3 million and 1.5 million jobs will be affected and that impact on the 
national wage bill will in the region of 0.3 per cent : a similar impact to that seen at the 
introduction of the NMW. It is possible that firms had sufficient room for manoeuvre 
to cope with the introduction of the NMW, but that they may find it more difficult to 
absorb another rise in their wage bills without paying greater attention to productivity 
levels or without witnessing some increase in unit labour costs.  
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Table 1 Number of jobs paid below National Minimum Wage rates 
 
 All jobs Jobs filled by people 
aged 18-21 
Jobs filled by people 
aged 22 and over 
 Thousands Per cent Thousands Per cent Thousands Per cent 
April 1998 1,420 6.0 120 7.3 1,310 5.9 
April 1999 530 2.2 40 2.3 490 2.2 
April 2000 240 1.0 40 2.2 200 0.9 
April 2001 250 1.0 40 2.1 210 0.9 
 
Source: National Statistics (2002) 
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Table 2 Changes in National Minimum Wage rates 
 
Date announced Date 
implemented 
Main rate a Development rate  
(Workers aged 22 
and over) b 
Development rate  
(Workers aged 
18-21) b 






15th February 2000 1st June 2000   £3.20 
15th February 2000 1st October 2000 £3.70   
March 2001 1st October 2001 £4.10 £3.50 £3.50 
March 2001 1st October 2002 £4.20 £3.60 £3.60 
 
a Main rate applies to workers aged 22 and over, except those in the first 6 months of a new job with a new employer and are receiving accredited training.  
b Development rate applies to all workers aged 18-21 inclusive. It is also payable to workers aged 22 and over who are in the first 6 months of a new job with a new 
employer and are receiving accredited training.  
 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry (2001). A more detailed history of the National Minimum Wage is presented at: http://www.dti.gov.uk/er/nmw/nmwhist.htm  
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Table 3 Gross value -added per job at current prices, £ thousand 
 
Daffin and Lau (2002) Our ABI database SIC92 
Section 
Description Year 
£ thousand Index £ thousand Index 
       
C-O* All ABI sections 1998 28.8 100.00 28.1 100.00 
  1999 30.3 105.21 29.5 104.71 
  2000 31.3 108.68 30.6 108.60 
       
D Manufacturing 1998 34.0 100.0 33.7 100.0 
  1999 35.2 103.5 34.7 103.0 
  2000 36.5 107.4 36.0 106.7 
       
C-F Production & construction 1998 36.1 100.00 34.4 100.00 
  1999 38.0 105.26 36.1 104.89 
  2000 40.2 111.36 38.5 111.98 
       
G-O* Service sector 1998 25.3 100.00 25.0 100.00 
  1999 26.8 105.93 26.4 105.23 
  2000 27.4 108.30 27.0 107.77 
       
 
* Excludes SIC(92) Divisions 65, 67, 70, 75, 80 and 85.   
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Table 4 Correlation Between Growth in Labour Productivity and Wage Bill Impact of NMW 
 
 Overall 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-2000 1995-98 1998-2000 
All industries   (n=183) 0.04 0.14* 0.06 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.12 0.01 
Quartiles 3 and 4   (n=87) 0.05 0.17 0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.04 0.12 0.04 
Quartile 4   (n=42) 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.13 0.07 
LPC sectors   (n=24) 0.06 0.03 0.25 -0.11 -0.003 0.12 0.29 0.02 
 
* significant at 10 per cent level.  
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Constant 0.007    
(0.47) 
























       
Adjusted R2 0.018 0.029 0.011 0.007 0.001 0.002 
       
Observations  522 522 522 362 362 362 
       
 
Notes:  
1. Absolute values of t-ratios in parentheses 
2. Standard errors are heteroscedastic consistent 
3. Time dummy variables included in all regressions 
4. *significant at 95% level, ** significant at 90% level,  
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Table 6 Regressions of Labour Productivity Growth, Total Factor Productivity and Capital-Labour Ratio on the Wage Bill Impact of 
the NMW 
 



























Capital-labour ratio 0.681* 
(8.54) 








































- - - 
Wage bill impact 
of NMW post 1998 






       
Adjusted R2 0.259 0.028 0.013 0.258 0.018 0.013 
Durbin Watson 1.66 1.79 1.81 1.66 1.78 1.81 
       
 
Notes:  
1. Number of observations: 884 
2. Absolute values of t-ratios in parentheses 
3. Standard errors are heteroscedastic consistent 
4. Time dummy variables included in all regressions 
5. *significant at 95% level, ** significant at 90% level,  
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Table 7 Correlation Between Growth in Unit Labour Costs and Wage Bill Impact of NMW 
 
 Overall 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-2000 1995-98 1998-2000 
All industries   (n=183) 0.001 -0.11 -0.09 0.10 0.08 0.01 -0.08 0.07 
Quartiles 3 and 4   (n=87) 0.01 -0.07 -0.07 0.10 0.08 -0.01 -0.02 0.08 
Quartile 4   (n=42) -0.01 -0.07 -0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.03 



































































































































Number of employees affected
Proportion of employees affected
 
 Notes:  All other industry sectors omitted due to low numbers and proportions of employees affected. 
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